Chiang Kai-shek and the McMahon Line, P. 3

Who Started the Oct. 20 Offensive on Sino-Indian Border? Some Fresh Light on An Overblown Affair, pps. 2-3

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. X, NO. 45 DECEMBER 10, 1962 WASHINGTON, D. C. 15 CENTS

A Hopeful Crisis Story The Government Withholds

During the Cuban crisis, the big fear in this country was that the Russians might retaliate by taking action against Berlin. It should therefore be news of the first order that during the crisis these fears were diminished by the mutual surveillance of each other's troop movements in the Berlin area by the U.S. and Soviet military commands in Germany. Each side had a military mission on the other's territory, and in the Berlin area was even able to use helicopters with the other's consent to make sure that no threatening buildup was occurring. Fear and misinformation might easily have led to a miniature 1914 interplay of mobilization and counter-mobilization, escalating beyond either's control into war. Yet for some reason the press officers of the government have done their best to keep this story under wraps, and no reference to it appears in any of the "now it can be told" stories appearing in various magazines.

Just What We Proposed at Geneva

The silence is the more curious because this aspect of the Cuban crisis was a kind of successful pilot model exercise in "arms control," ordinarily a favorite topic with the Pentagon when disarmament comes up for discussion. It illustrated the value in a crisis of certain provisions in the U.S. draft plan for a treaty on general and complete disarmament we tabled at Geneva last April 18. In Stage 1, Section F on "Reduction of the Risk of War," the U.S. called for exchange of military missions and advance notice of major military movements in order to reduce the danger of war by miscalculation or accident. When Mr. Zorin on July 19 at Geneva indicated Soviet agreement (similar provisions were included in Section 17a of the Soviet draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union on September 22), Mr. Dean welcomed this three days later and asked whether the Russians were "prepared to consider an arrangement of this kind as an initial measure that can be negotiated and implemented" without waiting for completion of negotiations on general disarmament.

So far as I can learn there was no answer from the Russians. But the experience in the Berlin area during the Cuban crisis would have seemed an excellent opportunity to press the point and educate the U.S. public on its significance. Yet no story on this mutual surveillance came out of Berlin or the Pentagon. It came to light here only by chance when Wm. C. Foster, chief of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was interviewed by a panel of three newsmen (one British, one Japanese, one American) on a Voice of America program Nov. 27. The American participant, Earl H. Voss, wrote a story which appeared that day on page one of his paper, the *Washington Star*, "Russia, U.S. Monitored Troop Shifts in Crisis," but no transcript and no tape could be obtained from the State Department press office, which did its best to discourage any follow up. It took me a week to get a transcript from the Voice of America.

Military missions came up in the interview when Mr. Voss said both the President and Chairman Khrushchev had mentioned the possibility of a detente once they got by the Cuban crisis and asked, "Can you tell us how you see such a detente developing?" "If we were to increase the exchange of military missions between the two sides," Mr. Foster replied, "so that one side could observe what the other side was doing, this tends to stabilize the relationships." Later Mr. Voss asked, "Could you go into detail on how that would work? Would the Russians be stationed say at Cape Canaveral and a few other of our bases in exchange for our getting American military men at their bases?" Mr. Foster instead of answering the question directly said we already had such an exchange of missions in East and West Germany where they "have been useful in giving information on the movements of troops, on the fact that these are maneuvers and not an actual concentration in anticipation of an attack." Mr. Voss wanted to know whether these missions operated during the Cuban crisis "and were we getting information on troop movements, if any?" Mr. Foster answered, "Yes," and said the arrangement went back to the Postdam agreement. Actually the exchange antedated the Potsdam agreements and was not connected with them. The U.S., Soviet and British commands in Germany

(Continued on Page Four)

Is Peace Un-American?

"With the fate of humanity resting on a push-button, the quest for peace has become the highest form of patriotism. Women's Strike for Peace is a grass-roots movement to that end. We are not an organization and we do not ask of any woman her race, religion or politics. We do not ask an oath of loyalty to any set of beliefs. Instead we ask loyalty to the race of man. Any woman who sees the threat to all mankind and who will work to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control is welcome to work with us. We submit it is not we women who should be 'investigated' but those who, with the cool logic of madness, attempt to reconcile us to complete destruction. Our 'crime' is to cry aloud that nuclear war must not be permitted, and we shall continue to cry aloud with all our strength. We do not fear the contamination of ideas; we fear the conspiracy of silence. The time is long past when a small group of censors can silence the voice of peace. To muzzle honest debate in the name of national interest is to do our country, and the world, a fatal disservice."

—From the reply issued by Women Strike for Peace Dec. 3 to the subpoenas served by the House Un-American Activities Committee on its leader, Dagmar Wilson, and 13 other women to appear at hearings Dec. 11, 12 and 13 to investigate the peace movement.

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A Fresh Look at the Fighting on the Sino-Indian Border . . .

The recent major burst of warfare on the Sino-Indian border began on Oct. 20. Which side began it? The U.S. press refers constantly to a Chinese offensive which opened on that date. If this *was* a Chinese offensive, then the sudden unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal by Peking is puzzling. But if it was the Indian side which provoked the fighting, then the Chinese may have pushed forward in order to demonstrate their military strength so that their renewed offer to negotiate would not be taken as a sign of weakness.

Victorious Attack Expected

In his first report on the outbreak of the fighting, the able Delhi correspondent of *The Times* of London noted (Oct. 22), "For the past few weeks the public has been led by the newspapers to expect a victorious Indian attack on the Chinese who had crossed the Tongla ridge," at the extreme western end of the McMahon line. Chinese troops had occupied the south face of the ridge Sept. 8. The Indians regard the south face as in their territory while the Chinese claim the whole ridge is in theirs.* The Indians began extensive preparations to retake it. On Oct. 11 Peking reported 33 Chinese and 6 Indians killed in Indian attacks at this point on the border. Delhi the same day declared it was the Chinese who attacked but the London *Times* Delhi correspondent said of the brief communique issued by the Indians, "This skimpy account does not answer the question whether the Indian army is now beginning its attack to push the Chinese intruders back across Tongla Ridge. . . . The Indian Army has now had time to complete its deployment of forces south of the Tongla Ridge. The Government, having given orders that the Chinese must be thrown back over the border, has been showing signs of impatience, but the new corps commander in the area, Lt. Gen. Kaul, must by now have worked himself and the many specialist officers he took from Delhi into the command and it could well be that tonight's report—issued only after Peking had announced an attack by Indians and heavy fighting—could signal the beginning of an operation to clear Chinese troops from the south face of Tongla Ridge." The next day the London *Times* Delhi correspondent cabled, "Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister, confirmed today that the Indian Army had been ordered to clear the Chinese from Indian territory which they are occupying south of the McMahon line."

That the Indians were preparing a large scale attack was also evident from the report by the Indian correspondent of the London *Economist* (Oct. 20) who wrote:

"For the first time since the Sino-Indian border dispute began, the Indian people know where it stands. After months in which New Delhi has blown hot and cold in successive breaths, one could almost feel the relief that greeted Mr. Nehru's flat statement on Oct. 12 that the army had been ordered to push the Chinese out of their latest foothold in the North East Frontier Agency. He followed it next day with an appeal to the people to back the troops in the front line 'with discipline and increased production.' It is as if Chamberlain had given way to Churchill. . . . The Indians mean what they say about pushing the Chinese out. . . . They have at least 50,000 men deployed under a new and energetic, but not battle-tried, corps commander, Gen. B. M. Kaul, who was moved two weeks ago from leadership of the army staff to take charge in the North East Frontier Agency. . . ."

This did not go unnoticed on the Chinese side. The *Peking Review* for Oct. 19 [which recently arrived here with a big batch of Chinese publications delayed by our postal censorship] carries the text of an editorial, "Mr. Nehru, It Is High Time for You To Pull Back from the Edge of the Precipice" from the Peking *People's Daily* of Oct. 14. This said, "A

*** In an editorial Oct. 12 the London Times said of this move, "The Chinese action is evidently in retaliation against Indian moves made in the Ladakh area earlier in the summer. Indian posts were pushed forward there in territory where the Chinese were in occupation—if military posts alone can amount to occupation in such wild and uninhabited country. The Chinese have now moved south of the McMahon line to demonstrate their claim, though they have done it at a point where there is a discrepancy between the line as shown on the maps and indicated by the watershed. They claim it is the Indian troops and not theirs that are on the wrong side of the line."**

The U.S. and the McMahon Line

"State Secy. Herter refused Nov. 12 to take 'any sides' in the border dispute between India and Communist China. Herter, while reaffirming the U. S. sympathy for India, told newsmen the Indian-Chinese-Tibetan border was 'ill-defined' and that the US lacked 'first hand knowledge, particularly . . . (about) the northwestern area [Ladakh—IFS], with respect to the definitive border that could rightly be claimed by either side'."

—Facts on File 371B2, Nov. 12-18, 1959.

"In Washington, the Secretary of State (Mr. Herter) said at a news conference on Nov. 12 that . . . so far as he knew, the USA had never officially endorsed the McMahon Line. . . . Any decision on the merits of the case could only be taken after one side or the other had appealed to the UN on the ground that the situation constituted a threat to international peace."

—Keesing's Archives (London), Nov. 21-28, 1959.

Thumb-Nail Sketch of the Distant Land—Ladakh—Whose Northeast Corner Is In Dispute

"Ladakh was annexed in 1841 by Gulab Singh, Rajah of Jammu, leading to armed border conflict with the Tibetan authorities. In 1842 two separate treaties were concluded whereby it was agreed that the boundary of Ladakh 'as fixed from ancient times' should be respected and not be subject to further violations; one of the treaties was signed between Gulab Singh and representatives of the Dalai Lama of Tibet, and the other between the respective suzerains—the Sikh kingdom in the Punjab, and the Chinese Emperor. The frontier line was not fixed by maps but was regarded by the British, Tibetan and Chinese authorities alike as established by custom and tradition.

"Situated 17,000 feet above sea level, Ladakh has an area of about 37,000 square miles and a population of less than 100,000. Barren, inhospitable and undeveloped, it has no industries, only primitive agriculture, and no road communications apart from a long and difficult road passing through remote country which, together with two airstrips, constitutes the only supply link with Kashmir. Lamaistic Buddhism is the prevailing religion, more than half of Ladakh's arable land being owned by 28 monasteries (gompas). Great influence is wielded by eleven incarnate lamas (shenshaks), of whom the senior—the Shenshak Bekub—is Chief Lama of Ladakh and now holds the post of Minister of State for Ladakh Affairs in the Kashmir Government."

—Keesing's Archives (London), p. 17,120 Nov. 21-28, 1959.

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. . . And An Antidote to the Exaggerations in the American Press

massive invasion of Chinese territory by Indian troops on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary seems imminent. Indian Prime Minister Nehru declared on Oct. 12 that he had issued instructions to the Indian armed forces 'to free Chinese territory in the Northeastern frontier Agency of Chinese intruders'," and spoke of "the massive attack for which the Indian armed forces have now completed their preparations and which they are only waiting to unleash." The editorial asserted that Chinese troops had never crossed the McMahon line but that the Indians had. It named a list of points held by the Indians which it claimed were north of the McMahon line, i.e., on the Chinese side, and declared, "Therefore, the ones who should be cleared off are the intruding Indian troops; certainly not the Chinese troops who are defending their own frontier." * The next issue of the *Peking Review* (Oct. 26) carried the text of a Chinese government statement dated Oct. 24 saying "on Oct. 20, Indian forces started a massive general offensive in both the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border. In these serious circumstances, the Chinese frontier guards had no choice but to strike back in self-defense."

Did the Chinese Anticipate?

It would seem from all this that India was preparing a major offensive. The Chinese claim they struck back in reply to it. Other observers believe the Chinese struck first in anticipation of the offensive building up against them. Thus a military expert writing in the London *Sunday Times* Oct. 21, after fighting broke out, said that in view of the order issued by Nehru on Oct. 12, "It now looks as if the Chinese troops . . . decided to get their blow in first."

In either case, the Chinese advance takes on the aspect not of an attempt to invade India but to demonstrate that the Chinese could not be pushed back by force. Having demonstrated strength, they could afford to fall back to the McMahon line and offer a peaceful settlement without loss of face.

*** The Times of London in an editorial Oct. 23 said the Chinese "have been denying that they had crossed the line and have maintained that their actions were no more than a reply to the assault the Indians were mounting. And there is on the ground and on the maps, some excuse for the dispute at this point, even if the Chinese arguments are flimsy." The London Economist (Oct. 20) also said, "The most intriguing uncertainty is whether the area really is south of the McMahon line at all."**

Chiang Kai-shek and the McMahon Line

"The drawing together of India and the United States in these changed circumstances was illustrated and helped by the statement of Mr. Galbraith, the American Ambassador here, who said that Washington regarded the McMahon Line as the legal international boundary. The previous position taken by Washington had been warily stated by Mr. Christian Herter, the previous Secretary of State, probably with an eye to reactions in Formosa. . . ."

—The Times (London), from Delhi, Oct. 29.

"The Chinese Nationalist Foreign Ministry has lodged a formal protest with the United States on the Sino-Indian border dispute, as a result of statements by Prof. J. K. Galbraith, the U.S. Ambassador, and a State Department spokesman supporting the 'controversial McMahon line.' The protest said the American view was contrary to historical facts."

—The Times (London), from Hongkong, Nov. 10.

"In his book China's Destiny written in 1943 the Generalissimo left no doubt that he not only intended to recover all China's lost territories, including Taiwan, but also to reconquer Tibet. The 1960 China Year Book, published in Taipeh, showed a border even further south in India than Peking claims."

—Edgar Snow's new book, "The Other Side of The River: Red China Today", p. 121.

"In Nationalist Taiwan a collection of Atlases and geography books of 8 different countries (including Britain) has been put on display to prove that the McMahon line has been widely repudiated in the past."

—London Observer News Service dispatch from Singapore in the Washington Post, Dec. 3.

The real problem for Mr. Nehru is not military but ethical. The Delhi correspondent of The London *Times* emphasized it beautifully when he wrote (Nov. 9) of Nehru's "total war" speech in the Indian Parliament:

"As he has often done in the past, Mr. Nehru said that war between Indian and China could affect the world. But previously he had advanced this as a weighty argument for avoiding war. Today it seemed no more than a footnote. . . . In the past Mr. Nehru has always been ready to take on the role of reason in the nations' follies, and to urge on powers whose disputes threatened to light a greater conflagration that considerations of national pride be put aside in the interests of world peace: today such considerations are forgotten or unvoiced."

Nehru's Account of How India Discovered China Had Built A Road Across Ladakh

"Our attention was called to a small-scale map published in a Chinese newspaper indicating the rough alignment of the road. It was not possible to find out from this small map whether this road crossed Indian territory, though it looked as if it did. It was therefore decided to send reconnaissance parties to find out the alignment of the road.

"Two reconnaissance parties were accordingly sent last year. One was taken into custody by a superior Chinese detachment; the other returned and gave us some rough indication of this newly constructed road in the Aksai Chin area. According to their report, the road enters Indian territory in the south near Lake Jilganang and runs northwest, leaving Indian territory in the northwest corner of Ladakh.

"Representations were made to the Chinese government on Oct. 18, 1958, drawing their attention to the construction of a road through Indian territory and the arrest of 15 members of an Indian reconnaissance party within the Indian border. The Chinese government, in their reply on Nov. 1, 1958, notified the release of the party and claimed that the road ran through Chinese territory. . . .

"The entire Ladakh area, including Aksai Chin, became part of Jammu and Kashmir state as a result of a treaty signed in 1842. . . . Although no actual demarcation was made on the ground, maps were prepared on the basis of old usage and convention. These maps have been used in India for the last 100 years or so. They include the Aksai Chin region as part of Ladakh. . . . Old Chinese maps have shown a different alignment."

—Nehru to the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, Aug. 31, 1959 (text in Keesing's, p. 17116 Nov. 1959).

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Little Use Made of Arms Control Agency In An Arms Race Crisis

(Continued from Page One)

agreed in October 1944 to allow military missions in each other's respective zones of occupation. The present missions were formalized in a U.S.-Soviet military agreement signed April 5, 1947.

Thus an agreement reached years ago in wartime when the U.S. and the Soviets were allies and formalized before the cold war had time to freeze a permanent posture of hostility, turned out in a crisis years later to have great utility in preventing war by miscalculation. An Administration really concerned about disarmament and arms control would see that this story got out. The U.S. plan of last April, for example, called for the establishment of an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War to study just such measures. Now would seem to be a good time to press for its establishment. But Mr. Foster himself did not use the interview to develop the significance of all this; the subject was quickly dropped and the press office did its best to bury the story. No newspaper pursued it. This reflects a general indifference to the whole topic.

Bad For the ACDA's Morale

The fact is that the Cuban crisis can be seen as an arms race crisis. The President said the Russians tried to put missiles in Cuba to compensate for their inferiority in long range missiles. The tense days both sides experienced on the brink dramatically demonstrated the need for measures to prevent accidental or unintended war. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was set up to study just such matters, and has indeed been doing so. It has also been studying just how best to negotiate questions of arms reduction, troop deployment, and bases with the least possible danger to prestige and alliances. But it was allowed to play only a minimal, belated and peripheral role in the crisis. Mr. Foster did go to two meetings of the executive committee of the National Security Council (so I was told) but it was the Secretary of State who took him along the first time (Oct. 26), almost as a kindly afterthought, that perhaps his agency might have something to contribute! There is no sign that the White House during the crisis or since has been really interested in utilizing the agency in any major way. The Agency's morale has never been lower; even those who are not zealots for disarmament, and that applies to most of its top officials, feel hurt in their bureaucratic pride. In this as in other respects on which I hope to comment later, there is little indication that any lessons have been drawn from the crisis, other than the need for more and better arms.

U Thant's Gentle Lecture to the USA

"The West does not seem to appreciate the full significance of this obvious change of political climate in the Soviet Union [from Stalin to Khrushchev]. Throughout the fifties most Western leaders saw the world as a battlefield between two antagonistic systems, militantly expressing the principles of good and evil. Hence compromise was betrayal. . . . This view of the world purely in terms of black and white was, in essence, the Western response to Stalinism. However, This attitude persisted even when the character of Soviet challenge was already changing. . . .

"The United States is the one society in which the philosophy of material progress is a spectacular success. Democracy is not inhibited, as it is in Europe, by either the threat of social upheaval from below or the memory of a conservative past. But . . . political and social changes elsewhere worry most Americans. The revolt of the colonial people, who are in fact the ultimate heirs of 1776 . . . seems to be frightening and incomprehensible to the descendants of those who started it all at Lexington and Concord. . . .

"The attempt to pin the blame on scapegoats and subversives may have been emotionally comforting, but it has probably weakened the confidence of the American people. Nor is more and bigger defense spending the answer. . . . The real challenge to the United States is how to promote this trend towards a better future for all humanity . . . to ease the contrast between its own abundance and the poverty of mankind elsewhere.

"Let me cite one glaring instance. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, the living standards have largely remained stationary, or have even declined. Throughout the last decade, the fall in the price of raw materials, while priming the affluent societies of the West, has not only cancelled out the sum total of Western aid, but in many cases has led to an absolute drop in national income. One great lesson of this phenomena is that the world will not live in harmony so long as two-thirds of its inhabitants find difficulty in living at all."

—UN Gen. Sect'y U Thant at Johns-Hopkins, Dec. 2.

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I. F. Stone's Weekly. Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C. Published every Monday except during August and the last Monday in December and the first in January at 5618 Nebraska Ave., N. W., Washington, D. C. An independent weekly published and edited by I. F. Stone; Circulation Manager, Esther M. Stone. Subscription: $5 in the U. S.; $6 in Canada; $10 elsewhere. Air Mail rates: $15 to Europe; $20 to Israel, Asia and Africa.

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